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THE ABSURDITY OF THE ILLINOIS FELONY-MURDER
DOCTRINE
Aidan Beck

INTRODUCTION
Murder is generally defined as the “killing of a human being with malice
aforethought.”1
Malice aforethought is defined as “the requisite mental state for common-law
murder” and encompasses intent to kill, intent to inflict serious bodily harm,
extremely reckless indifference to human life, and, most contentiously, intent to
commit a dangerous felony.2 While these first three mental states specifically relate
to the intent to cause physical harm to another individual, or at least indifference as
to whether such physical injury does occur, the last mental state encompassed by
malice aforethought allows for a murder conviction even when a person or actor has
shown no such intent to cause physical harm to another nor indifference to causing
such physical harm.3 This is called the felony-murder rule.
The felony-murder rule is a doctrine that provides an exception to the traditional
mens rea requirement needed for a conviction of murder.4 The classic operation of
the felony-murder rule can be illustrated with a simple logical formula: “a felony + a
killing = . . . murder.”5 It defines as murder any death that occurs during the
commission of a felony “without regard to whether the death was the result of
accident, negligence, recklessness or purpose.”6 A classic example of the felonymurder rule’s application is when two individuals are burglarizing a home and one
burglar kills someone in the process. In this hypothetical, the other burglar is guilty
of murder despite taking no steps to aid his accomplice in the act of killing, even if
he did not anticipate that a killing might occur at all. A more absurd example of the
rule’s application is a situation where two individuals are burglarizing a home and

1. Murder, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); 18 U.S.C. § 1111.
2. Malice Aforethought, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
3. See id.
4. Anup Malani, Does the Felony-Murder Rule Deter? Evidence from FBI Crime Data, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
3, 2007), https://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/malani.pdf.
5. James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the Forces that Shape Our
Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1430 (1994); JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY,
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 329 (8th ed. 2019).
6. Peter J. McQuillan, Felony Murder and the Misdemeanor of Attempted Escape: A Legislative Error in
Search of Correction, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 821 (1987).
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the homeowner, or even a police officer, shoots and kills one of the burglars. In this
instance, the other burglar is convicted of murder despite him taking no action to kill
or physically harm anyone, even if he had shown absolutely no intent to kill anyone
either. Over time, jurisdictions have added various restrictions that seek to limit the
application of the rule, and thus to avoid such absurd results. One example of such a
restriction is limiting the felony-murder rule’s applicability to only certain types of
felonies, usually those determined by statute or court rule to be “inherently
dangerous.”7 But, though many jurisdictions seek to limit the felony-murder rule’s
application, others have taken no such steps. Right now, the felony-murder rule in
Illinois is one of the broadest and most overreaching in the United States8—it is time
for a change.
While the precise timeline of circumstances that led to the development of the
felony-murder rule is contested, it has been established that the rule originated in
English common law in the eighteenth century at the latest.9 Despite being the
birthplace of the rule, England abolished felony murder in 1957.10 Section 1 of
England’s Homicide Act of 1957 provides that a killing occurring in a felony-murder
situation will not amount to murder unless done “with the same malice aforethought
as is required for a killing to amount to murder. . . .”11 England was not alone in its
abolition of the felony-murder rule, as all but one of the common law nations that
had adopted the rule have since done away with it.12 The United States is now the
only Western country that still recognizes felony murder.13 Despite this trend among
common law nations to move away from the doctrine, the vast majority of states in
the United States still, in one form or another, have the felony murder law on the
books.14 The State of Illinois is one of these states, and the Illinois felony-murder
rule has been described as one of the broadest in the country.15
There are two main arguments often offered in support of the felony-murder rule.
The first is based on the utilitarian theory of criminal punishment and maintains that
the felony-murder rule deters people from committing felonies or at the very least

7. Malani, supra note 4, at 2 n.4; Tomkovicz, supra note 5, at 1465–67; see also DRESSLER & GARVEY,
supra note 5, at 341, 347.
8. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
9. Tomkovicz, supra note 5, at 1442–45; People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 313 (Mich. 1980).
10. Tomkovicz, supra note 5, at 1430 n.6; Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 313; MODEL PENAL CODE AND
COMMENTARIES § 210.2 cmt. 6 at 40 (AM. LAW INST. Proposed Official Draft 1980).
11. Homicide Act 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 1 (Eng.); MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES §
210.2 cmt. 6 at 40 (AM. LAW INST. Proposed Official Draft 1980); Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 313.
12. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.2 cmt. 6 at 39–40 (AM. LAW INST. Official Draft
1980).
13. Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, Felony-Murder Rule a Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 446, 447 (1985).
14. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.2 cmt. 6 at 40 (AM. LAW INST. Official Draft 1980).
15. Rhys Saunders, Illinois Gets Away with Felony Murder: The U.S. Supreme Court Refuses to Hear A
Challenge to Illinois’ Felony Murder Law, 108 ILL. B.J. 14 (2020); see also People v. Klebanowski, 852 N.E.2d
813, 819 (Ill. 2006) (“[W]e seek the broadest bounds for the attachment of criminal liability [under felony
murder] . . . . Our continued adherence to a proximate cause approach is further exemplary of how broadly we
seek to extend the reaches of criminal liability in the case of felony murder.” (quoting People v. Dennis, 692
N.E.2d 325, 335 (Ill. 1998)).
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deters them from using violent force while committing a felony.16 However, critics
maintain that there is a complete lack of reliable empirical evidence to prove these
claims.17 Further, critics also allege that few felons know about the felony-murder
rule18 or know that the rule imposes strict liability for deaths that occur during their
commission of a felony, and many felons do not expect that any harm will result from
the commission of their felony.19 Many of the deaths that lead to charges under the
felony-murder rule are unintentional, which raises an important question: how do you
deter an unintentional act?20 Additionally, in the case of Furman v. Georgia in Chief
Justice Burger’s dissenting opinion, he challenged the notion of criminal deterrence
generally.21 Chief Justice Burger aptly pointed out that “I know of no convincing
evidence that life imprisonment is a more effective deterrent than 20 years’
imprisonment, or even that a $ 10 parking ticket is a more effective deterrent than a
$ 5 parking ticket.”22
The next argument in support of the felony-murder rule is of a retributive nature
and maintains that a person who commits a felony should be strictly liable if a death
does occur, even if it is accidental.23 Put differently, a defendant who performs a
wrongful act cannot complain about being punished for their consequences, no matter
how unexpected.24 The retribution rationale for felony murder is rooted in the “evil
mind” theory prevalent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries when the rule was
developed.25 The “evil mind” theory focused on the resulting harm, not on the actor’s
mental state, in deciding the appropriate punishment.26 A convict, therefore, bore
responsibility for his felony and for any harmful result arising from the crime
regardless of his specific intentions.27 Critics maintain that this idea is at odds with
the premise of criminal law that individuals who commit wrongful acts or otherwise
engage in prohibited conduct should only be punished for voluntary acts that are
committed with a guilty mind or criminal intent.28 This retributive argument in favor
of the felony-murder rule is sometimes described as a legal fiction that seeks to
transfer the intent to commit an underlying felony to the act of killing in order to find

16. Malani, supra note 4, at 1; Roth & Sundby, supra note 13, at 450–51; DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra
note 5, at 333–34.
17. Malani, supra note 3, at 1; Roth & Sundby, supra note 13, at 451–452; DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra
note 5, at 333–34.
18. Malani, supra note 4, at 1.
19. Roth & Sundby, supra note 13, at 451–52; DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note 5, at 334.
20. Roth & Sundby, supra note 13, at 451–52; DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note 5, at 334; see Malani,
supra note 4, at 1.
21. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 342–44 (1972) (per curiam), superseded by statute, Federal Death
Penalty Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–32, 108 Stat. 1796, 1959–82 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–
3599) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citing K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT 206–08 (1968)).
22. Id.
23. Roth & Sundby, supra note 13, at 457–60; DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note 5 at 334–36.
24. Roth & Sundby, supra note 13, at 458; DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note 5, at 335.
25. Roth & Sundby, supra note 13, at 458.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See id., at 453–59.

DOCUMENT1 (DO NOT DELETE)

168

3/28/2022 6:12 PM

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 48:1]

culpability for homicide.29 Again, as far back as 1972, Justice Marshall in his
concurrence in Furman v. Georgia pointed out that punishment as retribution has
been condemned by scholars for centuries as an intolerable aspiration for a
government in a free society, writing that this idea was one of the principal reasons
for the adoption of the Eighth Amendment.30
This Note examines how the felony-murder rule operates in the State of Illinois,
as well as some of its consequences. The most notable and alarming consequence is
that it leads to some individuals facing the most severe punishments for situations
that can sometimes be appropriately described as accidents, or where one of the
perpetrators is killed by a third party.31 To combat this, the Illinois murder statute
that enshrines the felony-murder rule should be amended to ensure that individuals
who do not have any intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury and also do not show
any extremely reckless indifference to human life do not end up charged with and/or
convicted of murder. This Note does mean not suggest that those who participate in
a felony where a death occurs should escape all punishment. Rather, it argues that
they should face a lesser charge such as involuntary manslaughter if they do not
display the requisite mental culpability or if the killing is done by a third party. This
Note will also examine the approaches taken by the Model Penal Code as well as the
five states—Hawaii, Kentucky, Michigan, Massachusetts, and California—that have
effectively abolished the felony-murder rule, either through judicial action or through
the reformation of statutes by the legislature.
Part I of this Note will discuss the operation of the felony-murder rule in the State
of Illinois and provide examples of individuals convicted under the rule despite the
killing being done by a third party rather than the defendant himself. Part II will
examine reforms to the felony-murder rule that were suggested in the Model Penal
Code, as well as the approaches taken by Kentucky, Hawaii, Michigan, and
Massachusetts in abolishing the felony-murder rule. Part III will focus on the
California legislature’s approach in abolishing the felony-murder rule and the remedy
that was provided to those who had previously been convicted under the rule in
California. Part IV will discuss the issues inherent in Illinois’ application of the
felony-murder rule and will respond to arguments in favor of preserving the felonymurder rule as applied in Illinois. Finally, Part V will advocate for a specific
approach for how the Illinois legislature, as well as other similarly situated
jurisdictions, should limit the application of the felony-murder rule based on the
approaches taken by the Model Penal Code, Hawaii, Kentucky, Michigan,
Massachusetts, and California.

29. Roth & Sundby, supra note 13, at 446, 453–59; DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note 5, at 333, 335;
McQuillan supra note 6, at 821 n.6.
30. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 342–44 (1972) (per curiam), superseded by statute, Federal Death
Penalty Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–32, 108 Stat. 1796, 1959–82 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–
3599) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT (Henry Paolucci
trans., 1963)); id. (citing THOMAS W. WATERMAN, WATERMAN’S ARCHBOLD ON THE PRACTICE, PLEADING,
AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES, xv-xix (7th ed. 1860)).
31. Tomkovicz, supra note 5, at 1430; DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note 5, at 329; Malani, supra note 3,
at 2; McQuillan supra note 6, at 821; see also People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 313 (Mich. 1980); Guyora
Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. REV. 403, 405 (2011).
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I. ILLINOIS APPROACH TO FELONY MURDER
Illinois’ felony-murder rule has been described as one of the broadest in the
United States.32 The felony-murder rule is codified in Section 9-1(a)(3) of Chapter
720 of the Illinois Compiled Statutes. It provides:
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification
commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the
death:
(3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than
second degree murder.33
Under this statute, Illinois adheres to the proximate cause theory of felony
murder.34 In theory, this means that for a defendant to be liable for felony murder,
the act causing death must occur during a felony and be the direct and foreseeable
result of that felony.35 The proximate cause theory attaches liability for murder to a
defendant even if a co-felon is the one killed or if a police officer or the person
resisting the felony, i.e., a third party, commits the killing.36 This is opposed to the
agency theory of liability that is used to assign felony murder liability in the majority
of other jurisdictions.37 This theory only holds a defendant liable if he or one of the
co-felons was the cause of death.38
In practice, the proximate cause theory of felony murder in Illinois creates a strict
liability rule for murder involving any death that occurs during the commission of a
forcible felony, as defined by the legislature.39 This is because the Illinois Supreme
Court has used the phrase “sets in motion a chain of events” to characterize the “direct
and foreseeable” requirement needed for a conviction of felony murder under the
proximate cause theory.40 The effect of this characterization is that there is no need

32. Saunders, supra note 15; see also People v. Klebanowski, 852 N.E.2d 813, 819 (Ill. 2006).
33. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9–1(a)(3) (2021).
34. See People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 975–77 (Ill. 1997); see also People v. Johns, 802 N.E.2d 305,
309 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (citing Lowery, 802 N.E.2d 973).
35. Cf. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 976.
36. See id. at 975–76.
37. Cf. id. at 976.
38. Id.
39. See Martin Lijtmaer, Commentary, The Felony-murder rule in Illinois: The Injustice of the Proximate
Cause Theory Explored via Research in Cognitive Psychology, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 635
(2008) (“[I]f simply engaging in a criminal act is sufficient to establish that a death is foreseeable, then the
entire proximate cause limitation would be rendered superfluous.”); The Illinois legislature has created an
enumerated list of forcible felonies that would trigger the felony-murder rule: treason, first-degree murder,
second-degree murder, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal
sexual assault, robbery, burglary, residential burglary, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated kidnapping,
kidnapping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement, and any
other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual. 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-8 (2021).
40. People v. Hudson, 856 N.E.2d 1078, 1087 (Ill. 2006) (“Although the phrase ‘direct and foreseeable
consequence’ may have been a more precise way of defining the concept of proximate causation, the phrase
‘sets in motion a chain of events’ has also been used . . . in characterizing this concept.” (quoting People v.
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for the defendants who commit forcible felonies to anticipate the precise sequence of
events that lead to the death, but rather the felony must set in motion a causal chain
of events that eventually leads to someone being killed.41 The Illinois Supreme Court
has also stated that those committing forcible felonies know that they may encounter
resistance during the crime, making homicide during a forcible felony a reasonably
foreseeable result.42 In addition, the 1961 committee comments on the Illinois felony
murder statute state that forcible felonies are so dangerous that homicide occurring
from such a felony, even if accidental, should be held without further proof to be a
“strong probability,” and the Illinois Supreme Court has found this language to be
instructive.43 In a sense, the result of this judicial interpretation is to create a legal
fiction that death is the direct and foreseeable result anytime someone commits a
forcible felony, meaning any death occurring during such a felony will result in the
perpetrators being guilty of felony murder without any additional inquiry into
foreseeability.44 The Illinois Supreme Court has defended this application of the
felony-murder rule on public policy grounds, arguing that it benefits the public to
hold a felon responsible for the chain of events that should have been in his
contemplation and that this approach may deter criminals from such acts of
violence.45
This rule, as enacted by the legislature and interpreted by the Illinois Supreme
Court, has created some arguably absurd results over the years. One notable example
is seen in People v. Lowery. There, the defendant, Lowery, attempted to rob a group
of people in an alley.46 One of the victims began struggling with Lowery to gain
control of the gun and eventually succeeded, at which point Lowery fled the scene
and the robbery victim fired a shot after him.47 That shot hit an innocent bystander
Hudson, 821 N.E.2d 1203, 1209 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004))); see also Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 976 (“It is equally
consistent with reason and sound public policy to hold that when a felon’s attempt to commit a forcible felony
sets in motion a chain of events which were or should have been within his contemplation when the motion was
initiated, he should be held responsible for any death which by direct and almost inevitable sequence results
from the initial criminal act.”).
41. People v. Klebanowski, 852 N.E.2d 813, 819 (Ill. 2006) (“Those who commit forcible felonies know
they may encounter resistance, both to their affirmative actions and to any subsequent escape. . . . . ‘It is
unimportant that the defendants did not anticipate the precise sequence of events that followed [from his
crime].’” (quoting People v. Hickman, 319 N.E.2d 511 (Ill. 1974))); People v. Brown, 35 N.E.3d 1207, 1213
(Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (“To sustain a conviction for felony murder, the State need not prove the defendant
contemplated ‘that his actions would result specifically in death,’ only that he or she intended to commit the
underlying felony. To sustain its burden, the State must prove the defendant ‘set in motion a chain of events
which were or should have been within his contemplation.’” (internal citations omitted)).
42. Klebanowski, 852 N.E.2d at 819, 823 (quoting People v. Hickman, 319 N.E.2d 511 (Ill. 1974));
Hickman, 319 N.E.2d at 513 (“‘It reasonably might be anticipated that an attempted robbery would meet with
resistance, during which the victim might be shot either by himself or some one else in attempting to prevent
the robbery, and those attempting to perpetrate the robbery would be guilty of murder.’” (internal citation
omitted)).
43. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1; Committee Comments–1961 (West 1993) (“[I]t is well established
in Illinois to the extent of recognizing the forcible felony as so inherently dangerous that a homicide occurring
in the course thereof, even though accidentally, should be held without further proof to be within the ‘strong
probability’ classification of murder.”); see Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 977.
44. See Lijtmaer, supra note 39 at 635.
45. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 976–77; see also Klebanowski, 852 N.E.2d at 821–22.
46. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 975.
47. Id.
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and killed her, resulting in Lowery’s conviction of first-degree murder under the
felony-murder rule by the trial court.48 On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court
reinstated the conviction.49
Another example of the Illinois felony-murder rule’s troubling results is People
v. Klebanowski, where the defendant, Klebanowski, drove his friend, Winters, to an
alley and waited in his car for his friend to rob an unsuspecting victim they had seen
pulling into an adjacent garage.50 Winters followed his target into the garage and
pointed a black BB gun resembling a real gun at the victim.51 Winters demanded the
victim’s wallet, and the victim complied.52 Unbeknownst to the felon, the victim he
chose for the robbery was an off duty police officer, who pulled his own weapon and
gave pursuit before shooting and killing his assailant.53 Klebanowski was later
convicted of first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule for the death of his
friend at the hands of the officer, and the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the
conviction.54
A strikingly similar fact pattern lay behind the decision in People v. Dekens,
where an undercover officer set up a drug deal with Dekens and one of Dekens’s
accomplices.55 The two felons decided to try and rob the officer, obviously unaware
of his status, and during the transaction Dekens pointed a shotgun at the officer, who
in turn fired off several shots, killing Dekens’s accomplice.56 Dekens was charged
with first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule.57 However, the trial court
dismissed the murder charge and this decision was affirmed by the appellate court.58
The Illinois Supreme Court took issue with the dismissal of the murder charge,
reversing the decision and remanding back to the trial court with directions to
reinstate the charge and stating that “[a]s our cases make clear, application of the
felony-murder doctrine does not depend on the guilt or innocence of the person killed
during the felony or on the identity of the person whose act causes the decedent’s
death.”59
Yet another similar example is People v. Hudson, where the fifteen-year-old
Hudson was picked up by a group of friends who told him they were going to rob a
barbershop.60 Hudson carried a gun during the crime, but the gun was inoperable
because the trigger was removed.61 It turns out that there was an undercover officer
present at the scene of the robbery, and the officer shot and killed one of Hudson’s

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
852 N.E.2d at 815.
Id. at 816.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 823.
People v, Dekens, 695 N.E.2d 474, 475 (Ill. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 477–78.
People v. Hudson, 856 N.E.2d 1078, 1080 (Ill. 2006).
Id..
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co-felons.62 The trial court convicted Hudson of first-degree murder under the
felony-murder rule, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.63
An older case illustrates a situation similar to but more extreme than the
situations in Klebanowski, Hudson, and Dekens. In People v. Hickman, Hickman and
a group of others were burglarizing a warehouse when they were spotted by police,
and the officers spread out to apprehend the suspects at the scene.64 At one point
during the following events, an officer saw a figure walking towards him with a gun
and yelled for the person to drop the weapon.65 When the figure failed to respond,
the officer shot him.66 Unfortunately, the figure the officer had seen was a fellow
police officer; that police officer succumbed to his wounds from the shooting.67 As
a result, Hickman was convicted of first-degree murder under the felony-murder rule
and the Illinois Supreme Court once again affirmed the conviction.68
Interestingly, in November of 2019, the United States Supreme Court declined
to hear an appeal in Givens v. Illinois, which has a similar fact pattern as Hickman
and would have challenged Illinois’s felony-murder rule, specifically the state’s
reliance on the proximate cause theory.69 This case arose out of an attempted
burglary by Givens and two accomplices in Chicago where nineteen police officers
showed up at the scene, causing the burglars to try and flee in a van.70 The officers
fired seventy-seven shots into the vehicle, hitting all three men several times and
killing one of Givens’s accomplices.71 Based on this, Givens and the remaining
accomplice were convicted of murder, the Illinois Appellate Court rejected their
appeal, and the Illinois Supreme Court declined to review the decision.72
One needs only look to the Illinois statute setting forth second-degree murder to
understand the absurdity of these results. The Illinois second-degree murder statute
is found in Chapter 720, Section 5/9-2(a) of the Illinois Compiled Statues, which
provides:
(a) A person commits the offense of second degree murder
when he or she commits the offense of first degree murder as
defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of Section 9-1 of
this Code and either of the following mitigating factors are present:
(1) at the time of the killing he or she is acting under a sudden
and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by the
individual killed or another whom the offender endeavors to kill,

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id. at 1088.
People v. Hickman, 319 N.E.2d 511, 512 (Ill. 1974).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 511, 514.
Saunders, supra note 15, at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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but he or she negligently or accidentally causes the death of the
individual killed; or
(2) at the time of the killing he or she believes the
circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or
exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this
Code, but his or her belief is unreasonable.73
Because the second-degree murder statute refers only to subsection (a),
paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 9-1 and specifically omits subsection (a), paragraph
(3) (the felony-murder rule), a person convicted of second-degree murder must have
the actual intent to kill.74 Yet, this convicted person found with the actual intent to
kill faces a sentence ranging only from four to twenty years,75 while a person
convicted of felony murder with no intent to kill, who indeed may not even have been
the direct cause of the underlying death, faces a minimum of twenty years and up to
life in prison without the possibility of any early release.76 Until Illinois abolished
capital punishment in 2011, a person convicted of felony murder in Illinois could
have faced the death penalty.77

II. MODEL PENAL CODE, KENTUCKY, HAWAII, MICHIGAN, AND
MASSACHUSETTS APPROACHES TO FELONY MURDER
Over the years, several states have significantly limited the scope of their felonymurder rules to avoid some of the absurd results such as those witnessed in Illinois.
These states have taken various approaches, including requiring the underlying
felony to be “inherently dangerous”78 for liability to attach under the felony-murder
rule, or enumerating that the party killed not be one of the felons.79 The Model Penal
Code suggests a different approach to limiting the scope of the felony-murder rule
and reducing the strict liability aspect of the crime.80 Separate from the Model Penal
Code approach, a few states have gone as far as to abolish or abrogate the felony-

73. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2(a) (2021).
74. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(a) (2021).
75. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-30(a) (2021). Such an individual may also be eligible to receive
probation from the Judge. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-30(d) (2021).
76. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-4.5-20(a)(2021).
77. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (2021).
78. As seen in Illinois, limiting the felony-murder rule’s application to “inherently dangerous” felonies
does not necessarily mean that the scope of the rule will be narrow. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (2021);
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (West 1993).
79. Malani, supra note 4, at 2 n.4; Tomkovicz, supra note 5, at 1465–68; see also DRESSLER & GARVEY,
supra note 5, at 341, 347; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-8 (2021). It has been argued that these limitations have
not gone far enough by still allowing the intent to commit a felony to meet the mens rea requirement of murder
without any additional intent to kill or reckless indifference to human life. See People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d
304, 326 (Mich. 1980) (stating that despite Michigan law limiting the felony-murder rule’s application to certain
enumerated underlying felonies “it is no longer acceptable to equate the intent to commit a felony with the intent
to kill, intent to do great bodily harm, or wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency
of a person’s behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.”)
80. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 (AM. L. INST. 1980).
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murder rule as an independent theory of liability for murder altogether. These states
are Kentucky, Hawaii, Michigan, Massachusetts, and most recently, California. The
state legislatures of Kentucky and Hawaii, as well as California, have enacted
legislation abolishing the traditional application of the felony-murder rule,81 while
the state supreme courts of Michigan and Massachusetts have abrogated the
traditional application of the rule through judicial decisions.82 The approach taken
by the Model Penal Code, as well as the approach of each of the states which have
abolished felony murder, are discussed below.
A. Model Penal Code Approach
The Model Penal Code (MPC) is a model act that is drafted and published by the
American Law Institute to serve as a prototype for jurisdictions across the United
States.83 The American Law Institute’s goal is to assist state legislatures in updating
and standardizing their penal law by offering them examples and suggestions of
drafted statutes that the legislatures can follow.84 One such suggestion found in the
MPC is a severe limitation of the felony-murder rule. The MPC departs from the
traditional rule of felony murder with the purpose of abandoning the strict liability
aspects of the rule.85 Section 210.2 of the MPC would allow homicides that occur
during a felony to constitute murder only “if they [were] committed purposefully,
knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to
the value of human life.”86 At the same time, the MPC drafters recognized the
significance of a homicide that occurs during a violent felony, and thus they did not
entirely do away with the rule.87 Instead, the MPC establishes a presumption that a
person who commits an enumerated felony possesses the requisite recklessness and
indifference to human life needed for a murder conviction under the MPC.88 The
relevant section of the MPC is section 210.2, which provides:
(1) Except as provided in Section 210.3(1)(b), criminal
homicide constitutes murder when:
(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or
(b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life. Such recklessness
and indifference are presumed if the actor is engaged or is an
accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight
after committing or attempting to commit robbery, rape or deviate

81. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 707–701 (2021); KY. REV. STAT. § 507.020 (2021); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 187(a) (2021).
82. See Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 326; Commonwealth v. Brown, 81 N.E.3d 1173, 1196–97 (Gants, C.J.,
concurring) (Mass. 2017).
83. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.2 (AM. L. INST. 1980).
84. Herbert Wechsler, Foreword to MODEL PENAL CODE (AM. L. INST. 1985).
85. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.2 cmt. 6 (AM. L. INST. 1980).
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. See id.
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sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary,
kidnapping or felonious escape.
(2) Murder is a felony of the first degree . . . .89
It can be seen that the MPC all but abolishes the felony-murder rule in its attempt
to take away its strict liability nature by creating only a presumption of the requisite
mens rea for murder set forth in the statute under subsection (b) that an accused
defendant can attempt to rebut.90 This understanding of the MPC’s approach to
felony murder was also described by the Hawaii legislature, as discussed below,
when they amended their murder statute.91
B. Hawaii Approach
In 1972, the Hawaii legislature abolished the felony-murder rule and declined to
follow the approach suggested by the MPC’s drafters.92 In the legislative
commentary following the revised Hawaii murder statute, the Hawaii legislature
explained their understanding of the MPC approach to felony murder: “[t]he Model
Penal Code . . . has abandoned the felony-murder rule as a rule of substantive law
and has reformulated it as a rule of evidence. Extreme recklessness, which under the
[MPC] is sufficient to establish murder, may be presumed from the commission of
certain enumerated felonies.”93 However, in declining to follow suit, the Hawaii
legislature wrote “[t]he wiser course, it seems, would be to follow the lead of England
and India and abolish the felony-murder rule in its entirety,” and rejected the
presumption that a person who commits a certain felony possesses the requisite
recklessness and indifference to human life, saying that such a presumption has “no
logical bas[is].”94 The legislative commentary goes further in its condemnation of
felony murder, arguing that “[e]ven in its limited formulation the felony-murder rule
is still objectionable. It is not sound principle to convert an accidental, negligent, or
reckless homicide into a murder simply because, without more, the killing was in
furtherance of a criminal objective of some defined class.”95 The new approach
adopted by the Hawaii legislature requires the courts to engage in a separate factual
inquiry in each case to determine whether the defendant exhibited recklessness
sufficient to establish manslaughter or an intent with respect to causing death
sufficient to establish murder.96 The relevant portion of the Hawaii first-degree
murder statute following the abolition of the felony-murder rule provides:

89. Id. § 210.2.
90. See id.
91. Infra note 87.
92. Act of Apr. 7, 1972, Act 9, § 701, 1972 Haw. Sess. Laws 32, 86 (codified as amended at
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707–701 (2021).
93. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707–701 (2021).
94. Id. (footnotes omitted).
95. Id.
96. See id.
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A person commits the offense of murder in the first degree if
the person intentionally or knowingly causes the death of [a
person].97
C. Kentucky Approach
In 1974, the Kentucky legislature also abandoned the doctrine of felony murder
as an independent basis for establishing an offense of murder.98 Following the
enactment of Section 507.020, “deaths occurring in the course of other felonies must
be judged under the ‘intentional’ and ‘wantonness with extreme indifference’”
standards. Rather than imposing a strict rule that assumes felons meet the requisite
mens rea requirement for murder based on their intent to commit an underlying
felony, the legislature noted that a jury should determine “from all the circumstances
surrounding the felony” whether the defendant’s participation in the felony
constituted a “wantonness with extreme indifference to human life” and if not, the
defendant is not guilty of murder, even if his accomplice killed someone during the
commission of the felony.99 The relevant provision of the Kentucky murder statute
provides:
(1) A person is guilty of murder when:
(a) With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes
the death of such person or of a third person; . . . or
(b) . . . he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a grave
risk of death to another person and thereby causes the death of
another person.100
D. Michigan Approach
In 1980, the Michigan Supreme Court, partly influenced by the drafters of the
MPC, abolished the felony-murder rule in the State of Michigan.101 This was
possible because, according to the court, the Michigan legislature never codified the
felony-murder rule, and thus the rule was still applied under the common law.102 The
Michigan Supreme Court ruled that “it is no longer acceptable to equate the intent to
commit a felony with the intent” needed to convict a defendant of murder, and that a
defendant must be shown to have acted with intent to kill, intent to inflict serious
bodily harm, or with a “wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural
97. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707–701 (2021).
98. KY. REV. STAT. § 507.020 (2021).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. 1980).
102. See Id. In determining this, the Michigan Supreme Court opined that “Felony murder has never been a
static, well-defined rule at common law, but throughout its history has been characterized by judicial
reinterpretation to limit the harshness of the application of the rule. Historians and commentators have
concluded that the rule is of questionable origin and that the reasons for the rule no longer exist, making it an
anachronistic remnant, ‘a historic survivor for which there is no logical or practical basis for existence in modern
law.’” Id. (quoting, Roy Mitchell Moreland, Kentucky Homicide Law With Recommendations, 51 KY. L.J. 59,
82 (1962)).
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tendency of his behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm” to be convicted for
murder.103 This is true whether the murder occurs in the course of a felony or
otherwise.104 The court went on to say that a jury may not find “malice,” as needed
for a murder conviction in Michigan, from a defendant’s intent to commit the
underlying felony alone.105 In addition to “abrogating the common-law felonymurder rule” in the state of Michigan, the Michigan Supreme Court also condemned
applications of the felony-murder rule that would allow for a murder conviction of
one felon based on the “unforeseen and unagreed-to results of another felon” as
“fundamentally unfair and in violation of basic principles of individual criminal
culpability.”106 In the same way, the court also said that the application of the felonymurder rule where the death was “purely accidental” is “unjust and should be
precluded.”107
E. Massachusetts Approach
In 2017, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts severely limited the scope of the
felony-murder rule, effectively abolishing it in its traditional form.108 The court ruled
that “[a] defendant may not be convicted of murder without proof of one of the three
prongs of malice.”109 This ruling by the court removed felony murder as an
independent theory of liability for murder and limited a killing during the commission
of another felony to an aggravating element of murder.110 The court’s ruling in
Commonwealth v. Brown permits a jury to find the defendant guilty of first-degree
murder where a murder was committed in the course of a felony if the jury finds that
the acts were done with deliberate premeditation or with extreme atrocity or
cruelty.111 Hence, the murder conviction itself would require that the defendant
intended to kill, intended to cause severe bodily injury, or acted in a way that a
reasonable person would have known created a strong probability that a death would
occur.112 The opinion leaves the door open, however, to a conviction of first-degree
murder where the murder was neither premeditated nor committed with extreme

103. Id. at 329.
104. Id. at 328.
105. Id. at 327.
106. Id. at 327, 329.
107. Id. at 327.
108. Commonwealth v. Brown, 81 N.E.3d 1173, 1178 (Mass. 2017) (ruling that “the felony-murder rule is
unconstitutional” under the Massachusetts constitution and holding that in trials that commence after the date
of the opinion in this case, a defendant may not be convicted of murder without proof of one of the three prongs
of malice”).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Id.; see also Brown, 81 N.E.3d (Gants, C.J., concurring) at 1198 (“Without felony-murder liability,
the rapist who smothers the child rape victim could be found guilty of murder with actual malice if a jury found,
either from the violence of the rape or the smothering of the child, that the defendant had an intent to commit
grievous bodily harm or intended to do an act that, in the circumstances known to the defendant, a reasonable
person would have known created a plain and strong likelihood that death would result.”)
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atrocity or cruelty but was committed in the course of a felony punishable by life
imprisonment.113

III. CALIFORNIA APPROACH TO FELONY MURDER
In California, the statutory definition of murder is “the unlawful killing of a
human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.”114 Prior to 2019, a person could
be convicted of first-degree murder in California for any homicide that occurred
during the commission of a list of enumerated felonies, with no additional mens rea
requirement, similar to the felony-murder rule in Illinois.115 Critics of the felonymurder rule have long argued that the rule disproportionately affects women and
young people, and this argument applies to the California felony-murder rule as
well.116 It has been reported that seventy-two percent of women who were sentenced
to life in prison under the felony-murder rule in California did not commit a homicide
themselves.117 Additionally, the average age of a defendant convicted under the
felony-murder rule in California was twenty years old.118
In 2018, the California legislature decided to amend the felony-murder rule as
part of an effort to reduce the number of incarcerated individuals in California and
give prisoners more chances for early release.119 Long before the legislature decided
to take up the issue, the California Supreme Court had referred to the felony-murder
rule as a “barbaric” rule of “dubious origins” from a “bygone age,” but ruled that they
were powerless to change it as that was a task for the legislature.120 With the passing
of Senate Bill 1437, which went into effect in January 2019, the California legislature
drastically amended the felony-murder rule and offered a remedy to those who had
been previously sentenced under the rule.121 The bill, which is now law in California,
122
prohibits a participant in the perpetration of a felony from being liable for murder
unless that person was the actual killer, aided the actual killer with the intent to kill,
or was a participant in the felony acting with reckless indifference to human life.123
The bill did leave one exception where the felony-murder rule would still apply: if
the homicide victim is a peace officer who was killed in the course of their duties and
the defendant knew or reasonably should have known the victim was a peace officer,

113. See Brown, 81 N.E.3d at 1178.
114. CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (2021).
115. Id. §189 (2021).
116. See Abbie VanSickle, If He Didn’t Kill Anyone, Why Is It Murder?, N.Y. TIMES, (June 27, 2018).
117. Id.; Jazmine Ulloa, California sets new limits on who can be charged with felony murder, L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 30, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-felony-murder-signed-jerry-brown-20180930story.html.
118. Ulloa, supra note 118.
119. Id.
120. People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 708–09 (Cal. 1983); see also VanSickle, supra note 117.
121. S.B. 1437, 2017–2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(e) (2021); see also
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.95 (2021).
122. Senate Bill 1437 was codified at California Penal Code Sections 189(e) and 1170.95. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 189(e) (2021); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.95 (2021)
123. S.B. 1437, 2017–2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
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the felony-murder rule still applies.124 The relevant portion of the bill, as enacted in
California Penal Code Section 189(e), provides:
(e) A participant in the perpetration or attempted perpetration
of a felony listed in subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable
for murder only if one of the following is proven:
(1) The person was the actual killer.
(2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the intent to
kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited,
requested, or assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder
in the first degree.
(3) The person was a major participant in the underlying felony
and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.
(f) Subdivision (e) does not apply to a defendant when the
victim is a peace officer who was killed while in the course of the
peace officer’s duties, where the defendant knew or reasonably
should have known that the victim was a peace officer engaged in
the performance of the peace officer’s duties.125
Additionally, the bill also allows an individual convicted of first-degree murder
under the felony-murder rule to file a petition with the court to vacate their conviction
and be resentenced on any remaining counts.126 The relevant portion of the bill, as
enacted in California Penal Code Section 1170.95, provides:
(a) A person convicted of felony murder or murder under a
natural and probable consequences theory may file a petition with
the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s
murder conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
counts when all of the following conditions apply:
(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against
the petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory
of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.
(2) The petitioner was convicted of first degree or second
degree murder following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a
trial at which the petitioner could be convicted for first degree or
second degree murder.

124. Id.
125. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(e) (2021).
126. S.B. 1437, 2017–2018, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
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(3) The petitioner could not be convicted of first or second
degree murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made
effective January 1, 2019.127

IV. ISSUES WITH ILLINOIS’ APPROACH TO FELONY MURDER
While the felony-murder rule is in its very nature a departure from conventional
culpability requirements of a murder conviction,128 the Illinois approach to the
felony-murder rule is an even greater departure by allowing criminal defendants to
be convicted for murder if the killing was done by a third party unaffiliated with the
defendant or the accomplices of the defendant.129 Despite the Illinois Supreme
Court’s stance that such a result is sound for public policy reasons,130 allowing a
defendant to be convicted of murder without having any intent to kill, or intent to
cause severe bodily injury, or reckless indifference to human life—especially when
the killing is done by a third party—can be described as shocking to the conscience.
In theory, the felony-murder rule might deter individuals from using violent force
while committing a felony, or alternatively may deter individuals from committing
felonies altogether,131 but it does little to deter a third party from using violent force
and may even remove any inhibitions that may have otherwise deterred third parties,
in particular the police, from using such force, thus escalating the situation. Further,
many felons may not know that the felony-murder rule exists,132 so the presumption
that they know or should know that a death might probably occur during the
commission of a forcible felony (subjecting them to the possibility of facing murder
charges), likely does little to deter the commission of felonies in Illinois.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has argued that public policy justifies its
application of the felony-murder rule because it benefits the public to hold a felon
responsible for a chain of events that should have been in his contemplation when he
started his felonious act.133 This argument is valid on its face, but the issue with this
argument can be seen in the rule’s application. For example, the Supreme Court of
Illinois in People v. Hickman ruled that the death of an officer who was shot at the
scene of a burglary by a fellow police officer who mistook him for a perpetrator was
a “direct and foreseeable” consequence of Hickman and his associates’ decision to
burglarize a warehouse.134 It is hard to deny that the officer’s death was a direct
consequence of the burglary, as the officer would not have been shot and killed had
the police not been at the warehouse investigating the burglary; but was the death of

127. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.95 (2021).
128. See Malani, supra note 4.
129. See People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 975 (Ill. 1997); see also People v. Klebanowski, 852 N.E.2d
813, 815–16 (Ill. 2006); see also People v. Dekens, 695 N.E.2d 474, 475 (Ill. 1998); see also People v. Hudson,
856 N.E.2d 1078, 1080–81 (Ill. 2006); see also People v. Hickman, 319 N.E.2d 511, 512 (Ill. 1974).
130. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 976–77; see also Klebanowski, 852 N.E.2d at 821–22.
131. As previously noted, critics maintain that there is little evidence to support this argument. Malani,
supra note 4, at 1; Roth & Sundby, supra note 13 at 451–52; Dressler, supra note 5, at 333–34.
132. Roth & Sundby, supra note 13, at 451–52; Malani, supra note 4, at 1.
133. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 976.
134. Hickman, 319 N.E.2d at 513.
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the officer really foreseeable? Put differently, should the felon really have
contemplated that a third party would kill another third party while they burglarized
the warehouse? The court thought so, stating that “[t]hose who commit forcible
felonies know they may encounter resistance,”135 but encountering resistance usually
does not result in one police officer shooting and killing another, and it seems entirely
unreasonable to claim that this outcome was in any way “foreseeable.” It may be
true the killing was the result of a chain of events set in motion by the underlying
burglary, but was this causal chain not broken by the superseding cause of the
officer’s decision to shoot at a figure that he could not clearly identify? In a way, the
felony-murder rule when applied in this manner seems to give police officers an
added incentive to use deadly force when responding to the scene of a forcible felony.
At the very least, it reduces an officer’s inhibitions towards using lethal force. This
is because police officers are in a better position to understand the felony-murder rule
than the average prospective felon, and likely know that the felons themselves will
bear the liability for any resulting death that occurs as a result of such lethal force so
long as the officer can otherwise justify its use. This deadly force may result in the
injury or death of a felon who had no violent intentions, but it may also lead to the
injury or death of police officers or innocent bystanders.
Illinois’ approach to the felony-murder rule has also been justified on the theory
that it deters forcible felonies or at least deters felons from using violent force during
a felony.136 Arguments in support of the felony-murder rule that are based on
deterrence fail to address the fact that many of the killings which lead to liability
under the rule are unintentional. If they were not, the felony-murder rule would not
be necessary to apply, as the defendant would meet the requisite culpability needed
to be punished under another theory, such as murder, second-degree murder, or
manslaughter. Also, to put it simply, “how does one deter an unintended act?”137
Another issue with deterrence arguments used in favor of the felony-murder rule
comes to light when examining cases where felons are convicted of murder for
killings by third parties. In these situations, “the defendant has no control over the
acts of the third party and thus the rule cannot deter this sort of killing.”138 Yet,
another issue is that felons are unlikely to realize that the felony-murder rule imposes
strict liability for deaths that occur during a felony, and few will expect that a death
will result from the commission of their felony.139 Thus, because felons are unlikely
to understand how the rule works and unlikely to expect a killing to occur, the rule
can do very little to deter forcible felonies.140 There is also research that suggests
serious crimes are rarely deterred by varying the weight of the punishment.141
Finally, killings during felonies are relatively uncommon, and even fewer of those
killings are done without the requisite level of culpability to sustain a murder
135. Id.
136. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1 (1993), Committee Comments-1961, at 15 (Smith-Hurd 1993);
Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 977.
137. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 13, at 451.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 451–52.
140. Id.
141. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 13, at 452.
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conviction without the felony-murder rule.142 Considering this, “the addition of a
small risk of murder sanction for an unlikely event is probably not a major influence
on some prospective felons’ behavior.”143
Based on all of these considerations, the best solution for the State of Illinois to
avoid a defendant being convicted for accidental killing or killings done by third
parties would be for the legislature to follow the approach taken by Hawaii,
Kentucky, and California. This would entail amending the murder statute to vastly
restrict the scope of the felony-murder rule by limiting murder convictions to
situations where a defendant has an intent to kill, or cause severe bodily injury, or
shows reckless indifference to human life. Additionally, the legislature should follow
the example of the California legislature144 and offer a remedy to those who have
been previously convicted under the felony-murder rule but did not meet the new
mens rea requirement. Not only would this eliminate situations where a defendant is
liable for murder despite the killing being done by a third party, but it would also
potentially reduce the overall prison population of Illinois, take away a possible
inducement for police to use excessive force, and bring murder convictions in Illinois
back under the prevailing idea that fault is needed for every element of an offense for
an individual to be subjected to criminal punishment.145

V. THE PATH FORWARD AND PROGRESS ALREADY MADE
Individuals should not be charged with first-degree murder when they had no
intent to kill or knowledge that a killing might occur. Individuals should absolutely
not be charged with first-degree murder where the killing was done by a third-party.
These are not radical statements at all, because despite felony murder remaining on
the books in the vast majority of U.S. states, Illinois’s version of the rule is one of the
broadest, making Illinois one of the only states where individuals can be charged with
first-degree murder for a death caused by a third party.146 In order to bring Illinois
in line with the rest of the country, the scope of the felony-murder rule in Illinois
should be restricted to situations where a defendant has an intent to kill, or cause
severe bodily injury, or shows reckless indifference to human life. This is not to say
that defendants who participate in a crime where a killing occurs would or should get
off scot-free. They would still be liable for the underlying felony that they committed
and could also often be charged with involuntary manslaughter. In Illinois, the
involuntary manslaughter statute reads:

142. Tomkovicz, supra note 5, at 1456. See also Roth & Sundby, supra note 13, at 452 n.34 (“For instance,
only one-half of one percent of robberies result in homicide. The statistical data is summarized in Enmund v.
Florida, 485 U.S. 782, 799–800, nn. 23–24 (1982).”).
143. Tomkovicz, supra note 5, at 1456.
144. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.95 (2021).
145. Tomkovicz, supra note 5, at 1448 (“Modern scholarly and judicial thought considers fault for every
element of an offense to be an essential predicate for blame, responsibility, and punishment.”)
146. See Saunders, supra note 16; see also People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Ill. 1997).
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(a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without
lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts
whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are
likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and
he performs them recklessly147
Considering the various approaches taken by the MPC and the approaches taken
by the five states that have abolished the felony-murder rule, a combination of the
approaches taken by Hawaii, Kentucky, and California seems to be the best path for
Illinois to follow in order to alleviate the concerns raised here.
The approach taken by the MPC is not ideal because it presumes that a person
who commits an enumerated felony possesses the requisite recklessness and
indifference to human life needed for a murder conviction,148 and this presumption
would likely be hard to rebut given Illinois’s adherence to the proximate cause theory
of felony murder.149 The benefit to Hawaii’s approach is that in every case, the courts
must inquire what level of culpability the defendant exhibited and whether or not it
reaches the level of intent required for a murder conviction, and alternatively the level
of recklessness needed to establish manslaughter.150 Similarly, the benefit to
Kentucky’s approach is that courts must consider all of the circumstances
surrounding the felony to determine whether the defendant intended to kill or whether
his participation in the felony showed indifference to human life, and if neither of
these is met the defendant is not guilty of murder.151 California’s approach is more
similar to Kentucky’s approach than it is to Hawaii’s, and this is because, in both
California and Kentucky, reckless indifference to human life during the commission
of a felony is enough to trigger murder liability.152 This is arguably more ideal
because it alleviates some of the concerns that critics may have with doing away with
felony murder liability by ensuring that those who commit felonies without any
regard for who dies in their path do not get off easy. If it is true that the felonymurder rule really does deter felons from using or threatening violence in the
commission of their felony, this approach may retain that deterrent effect to some
degree because those who use or threaten violence certainly exhibit recklessness, if
not intent to cause bodily harm. Regardless, this approach solves the issue of
defendants facing first-degree murder charges when they exhibited no intent to kill
or cause severe bodily injury, and showed no reckless indifference to human life, and
also ensures no one will face first-degree murder liability for a killing caused by an
unrelated third party. California’s retention of the felony-murder rule for situations
where the homicide victim is a peace officer who was killed in the course of their
duties and “the defendant knew or reasonably should have known the victim was a
peace officer” also may alleviate concerns of felony murder proponents by ensuring

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3 (2021).
MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.2 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1980).
See People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 975–77 (Ill. 1997).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 707–701 (2021).
KY. REV. STAT. § 507.020 (2021).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(e) (2021).
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that felons would still bear liability for officers who are killed when attempting to
intervene in the crime and apprehend the suspects.153
The Michigan and Massachusetts approaches achieve similar results to those
achieved in Hawaii and Kentucky, however, Illinois should solve its problems with
the felony-murder rule through legislative action rather than through a ruling by the
Illinois Supreme Court. It is true that many of the problems with the felony-murder
rule in Illinois seem to stem from the interpretation and application of the rule, and
specifically the proximate cause theory of felony murder, used by the Illinois courts.
So, one alternative solution to legislative action would be for the Illinois Supreme
Court to do away with the proximate cause theory of felony murder and instead adopt
a different approach, such as the agency theory used by the majority of jurisdictions
in the United States.154 This is unlikely to occur in the near future however, as Illinois
has adhered to the proximate cause theory since 1935 and has expressly declined to
rethink its approach or to adopt the agency theory.155 Besides, because the felonymurder rule has been codified by legislative statute,156 the Illinois Supreme Court
could not completely abrogate the rule in the way the Supreme Courts of Michigan
and Massachusetts did. Abrogation of the rule by judicial decision is not ideal
anyway, because the legislature is better positioned to weigh the state interests in
retaining the felony-murder rule against the negative effects that the rule can have on
certain individuals and to craft an appropriate solution.157
Since the time this Note was written, the Illinois legislature has taken steps to
reduce the scope of the felony-murder rule. The Illinois General Assembly passed
Illinois House Bill 3653 (HB 3653), a broad bill, also referred to as the Illinois
Criminal Justice Reform Omnibus, seeking to reform both police in Illinois as well
as the state criminal justice system as a whole, and the senate approved the bill on
January 13, 202.158 The bill was signed into law by Governor J.B. Pritzker on
February 22, 2021.159 HB 3653 amends the felony murder provision of the Illinois
first-degree murder statute to read as follows:

153. Id. § 189(f).
154. See People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Ill. 1997).
155. People v. Payne, 194 N.E. 539, 543 (Ill. 1935) (“It reasonably might be anticipated that an attempted
robbery would meet with resistance, during which the victim might be shot either by himself or someone . . .
and those attempting to perpetrate the robbery would be guilty of murder.”); Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 976
(“[Payne] is exemplary of Illinois’ first application of the proximate cause theory.”)
156. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(a)(3) (2021).
157. People v. Pepitone, 106 N.E.3d 984, 992–93 (Ill. 2018) (“‘the legislature is in a better position than the
judiciary to gather and evaluate data bearing on complex problems.’” (quoting People v. Minnis, 67 N.E.3d
272, 289 (Ill. 2016)); see also People v. Williams, 638 N.E.2d 207, 212 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“It is the legislature,
and not the courts, that is in the best position to investigate and ascertain the evils confronting society and gauge
their seriousness.”)).
158. HB 3653: Police, Criminal Justice Reforms Bill Passed by Illinois General Assembly, NBC CHICAGO,
https://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local/chicago-politics/hb-3653-police-criminal-justice-reforms-billpassed-by-illinois-general-assembly/2415799/ (Jan. 13, 2021, 11:03 PM).
159. Id.
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A person who kills an individual without lawful justification
commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause
the death:
(3) he or she, acting alone or with one or more participants,
commits or attempts to commit a forcible felony other than second
degree murder, and in the course of or in furtherance of such crime
or flight therefrom, he or she or another participant causes the death
of a person.160
It is not yet clear how Illinois courts will interpret the new felony murder
provision, but the new law does seem like an attempt to limit the application of the
rule to instances where a death was caused directly by a participant in the forcible
felony rather than when the killing is caused by a third party. How this plays out in
practice will depend on how broadly the courts in Illinois interpret the phrases “in
performing the acts which cause the death” and “causes the death of a person.”161
The original draft of the bill sought to limit the felony-murder rule even further and
would have removed liability for first-degree murder in cases where the defendant
did not commit the act that caused a death and did not know that a death would occur,
as well as cases where the death was caused by a third party.162 Neither the original
bill nor the amended version was written to apply retroactively, meaning that, unlike
the California amended statute discussed herein, those defendants who were
previously charged with and convicted of first-degree murder under the previous
felony-murder rule would not be given any sort of relief.163
The passing and signing into law of Illinois HB 3653 is a remarkable step in
limiting the scope of the felony-murder rule and appears to be an attempt to solve
some of the problems raised in this note. The bill, now law in Illinois, may serve to
curb the application of the proximate cause theory of felony murder used by the
Illinois courts. Still, one further step that the Illinois legislature should take is to
allow individuals who were previously convicted of first-degree murder under the
felony-murder rule where the killing was done by a third party to petition the court
to have their sentence reconsidered, similar to what California did in 2019. Steven
Drizin, co-director of the Center on Wrongful Convictions and Clinical Professor of
Law at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, has described the Illinois felonymurder rule as “a major engine of mass incarceration in the state,” which he says is
“[b]ecause the punishment gap between a murder sentence and a sentence of a lesser
felony is so extreme, you keep people locked up for much longer periods of time than

160. H.B. 3653, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2021).
161. Id.
162. See Rita Oceguera, Sweeping criminal justice reform package would curtail felony murder
prosecutions
in
Illinois,
INJUSTICEWATCH
(Jan.
12,
2021),
https://www.injusticewatch.org/news/2021/criminal-justice-reform-felony-murder-prosecutions-illinois/ (“If
passed, the bill will ban prosecutors from filing first-degree murder charges in cases where defendants did not
commit the act or know it would occur, or where the death was caused by a third party. These amendments will
bring Illinois’ felony murder statute, one of the broadest in the nation, in line with those in dozens of other
states. The changes are not retroactive.”).
163. See id.; see also H.B. 3653, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2021).
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they need to be.”164 Thus, by allowing those previously convicted under the felonymurder rule to seek resentencing, Illinois could reduce its overall prison population
in the long run and fight back against the epidemic of mass incarceration that plagues
the nation.165

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Illinois felony-murder rule has been far too broad and has
resulted in defendants being convicted of first-degree murder when they had no intent
to kill nor any knowledge that a killing might possibly occur. It even resulted in
defendants being convicted of first-degree murder where the killing was done by a
third party. Illinois actually has had one of the broadest felony-murder rules in the
United States, and likely the broadest of any common law nation.166
In the past century, the world has seen a movement away from the felony-murder
rule, leaving the United States as the last Western country that still applies the rule.167
In the 1970s there was a trend of U.S. states abolishing the felony-murder rule,
possibly spurred in part by the American Law Institute’s attempted abolition of
felony murder within their MPC, first published in 1962.168 During the 1970s, three
states, Hawaii, Kentucky, and Michigan abolished the felony-murder rule,169 but after
1980, this trend seemed to come to a halt. In 2017, the Massachusetts Supreme Court
ruled that the felony-murder rule is unconstitutional in Massachusetts, effectively
abolishing it,170 and the California Legislature followed suit in 2019 by drastically
limiting felony murder in California.171 Illinois should be the next state to follow
this trend and abolish the felony-murder rule, or at the very least, amend their firstdegree murder statute to ensure that individuals who do not have any intent to kill or
cause serious bodily injury and also do not show any extremely reckless indifference
to human life do not end up charged with murder.
Luckily, Illinois HB 3653 has provided some evidence that much-needed change
may be seen in the near future as the new felony murder provision is interpreted and
applied by the Illinois courts. With HB 3653 being signed into law, Illinois’ felonymurder rule has not been fully abolished, but prosecutors will likely no longer be able

164. Oceguera, supra note 162.
165. Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE
(March 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html (illustrating that “[t]he American
criminal justice system holds almost 2.3 million people in 1,833 state prisons, 110 federal prisons, 1,772 juvenile
correctional facilities, 3,134 local jails, 218 immigration detention facilities, and 80 Indian Country jails as well
as in military prisons, civil commitment centers, state psychiatric hospitals, and prisons in the U.S. territories.”).
166. See Saunders, supra note 15; see also People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Ill. 1997); see also Roth
& Sundby, supra note 13, at 447.
167. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 13, at 447.
168. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.2 (AM. L. INST., Proposed Official Draft 1980).
169. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 707–701 (West 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (West 1984); People
v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. 1980).
170. Commonwealth v. Brown, 81 N.E.3d 1173 (Mass. 2017).
171. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189(e).
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to charge defendants with first-degree murder when a death was caused by a third
party,172 which is a huge leap from the state of the law as it has existed for decades.
Still, many people remain in prison for first-degree murder despite having no
intent to kill or to cause severe bodily harm and showing no reckless indifference to
human life; some of the deaths in these cases were caused by third parties. Illinois
should offer a remedy to these individuals in order to bring Illinois more in line with
the rest of the United States and the world as a whole.

172. H.B. 3653, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2021).

